Iran's existing stockpile of 60 per cent enriched uranium, estimated at 440 kilograms, is already sufficient to produce nuclear weapons, according to U.S. nuclear experts Steve Fetter and Tara Drozdenko. The strikes by the United States and Israel on Iranian nuclear facilities last year, which President Donald Trump claimed had obliterated Iran's nuclear capacity, may have backfired by removing diplomatic incentives that previously restrained Iran's weapons ambitions. Before the attacks, Iran's decision to cap enrichment at 60 per cent was political, not technical, Drozdenko said, noting that the country could have advanced further if it chose to. The early stages of uranium enrichment are the most laborious, meaning Iran's current stockpile drastically shortens the time needed to reach weapons-grade levels—what experts call "breakout time."
Fetter, who led nuclear security efforts under President Barack Obama, stated that Iran possesses the expertise to rebuild centrifuge operations even if current facilities were destroyed, especially if the enriched material remains recoverable. He added that Iran's most likely weapon design would mirror the simple gun-type device used on Hiroshima, which requires 80 per cent enriched uranium and is well within the capabilities of Iranian scientists. Drozdenko, who managed U.S. sanctions on Iran and North Korea as head of the Treasury's Country/Regime Sanctions Unit, confirmed that Iran was likely months away from weapons-grade capability before the strikes—if that had been its goal. She emphasized that prior diplomatic engagement showed promise, suggesting Iran had not been actively pursuing a bomb. The bombing of Iranian cities, destruction of military assets, and assassination of senior leaders have now altered Tehran's strategic calculus. Iran has not publicly announced any decision to weaponize its nuclear program, but experts warn the conditions that once held it back no longer exist.
When Steve Fetter says Iran's 60 per cent enriched uranium is "directly usable" for weapons, he is not describing a future threat but a present capability masked as a technical discussion. The U.S. and Israeli strikes did not erase Iran's nuclear knowledge or materials—they erased the political reason Iran had for holding back. What was once a restrained program under diplomatic pressure is now incentivized by survival logic: if you are treated like a nuclear state under attack, you may as well become one. The war meant to prevent a bomb may have triggered the very decision it sought to avoid.
