Governor Babagana Zulum of Borno State has confirmed that Jilli market, located on the border between Borno and Yobe states, was closed five years ago by his administration. This clarification came in response to reports of an airstrike by the Nigerian Air Force (NAF) on the market area in Gubio Local Government Area on Saturday. Zulum, in a statement issued by his spokesperson Dauda Iliya, stated he had been fully briefed on the operation carried out by the Air Component of Operation Hadin Kai. He described Jilli market as a known hub allegedly used by Boko Haram insurgents and their logistics suppliers. The governor emphasized that the Borno State Government had shut down both Jilli and Gazabure markets five years ago and had not authorized their reopening. He affirmed ongoing coordination with Yobe State and military authorities regarding security operations in the region. Zulum reiterated his administration's commitment to protecting civilians and supporting joint efforts to achieve lasting peace. The Nigerian Air Force confirmed the airstrike, stating it targeted terrorist elements linked to recent attacks on security forces. Air Commodore Ehimen Ejodame, NAF's Director of Public Relations and Information, said the Civilian Harm Accident and Investigation Cell (CHAI-Cell) had been deployed to investigate claims of civilian casualties. NAF maintained the strikes were conducted to disrupt fleeing insurgents exploiting difficult terrain.
Babagana Zulum's insistence that Jilli market has been officially closed since 2019 exposes a critical gap between policy and ground reality. Despite a five-year closure, the market remained active enough to draw both insurgents collecting levies and a military airstrike, suggesting state directives often fail to translate into enforceable control. The fact that civilians were present during the strike, allegedly because insurgents moved into the market to collect levies, points to the persistence of parallel governance structures in conflict zones—where Boko Haram still enforces taxation and movement, even in areas declared closed by the state.
This incident underscores the fragile authority of civil governance in Nigeria's northeast. Zulum's coordination claims with the military and Yobe State ring hollow when basic facts on the ground—like an operating market in a closed zone—go unverified before lethal force is applied. The activation of CHAI-Cell after the fact does not erase the lapse in real-time intelligence or the state's inability to physically secure or monitor such areas. The military's focus on "fleeing remnants" means operations often rely on time-sensitive, high-risk targeting that can overlook civilian presence, especially in zones where administrative control is nominal.
Ordinary residents of Gubio and border communities bear the brunt of this disconnect. They live under the constant threat of insurgent reprisals and military overreach, with little protection or clarity from either side. Farmers, traders, and displaced families trying to resume livelihoods in these zones operate in legal and physical limbo, vulnerable to violence from all actors. The continued use of Jilli market, despite its official closure, reveals how survival often trumps compliance when governance is absent.
This is not an isolated error—it reflects a recurring pattern in Nigeria's counterinsurgency: military actions outpacing civilian oversight, and policies declared without the mechanisms to enforce them.
