The federal government's strategy of negotiating with armed criminal groups has come under sharp criticism from public affairs commentator Mahdi Shehu, who attributes the recent surge in nationwide killings to what he describes as government appeasement. In a statement posted on X on Friday, April 10, 2026, Shehu cited a sharp rise in violence beginning in November 2025, with a marked escalation from February 2026 onward. He described the killings, which have targeted both civilians and security operatives, as deliberate and systematic. Security forces, he noted, are overburdened and ill-equipped to confront well-armed criminal gangs. "All security agencies are overstretched, insufficient in number, and poorly equipped compared to the weaponry in the hands of criminal gangs," Shehu said. He linked the worsening security situation directly to ongoing negotiations, concessions, and amnesty programmes, which he argued incentivise violence by offering criminals a path to legitimacy without accountability. Shehu demanded an immediate end to such policies, insisting they embolden rather than deter criminal elements. He called for a shift toward treating all armed criminal groups as irreconcilable threats to national order. The statement did not reference any specific region or group but pointed to a nationwide pattern of violence. No official response from the federal government or security agencies was reported by the time of publication. What happens next depends on whether security policy undergoes a fundamental shift or continues along its current trajectory.
Mahdi Shehu's critique cuts to a deeply uncomfortable truth: the state's attempts to pacify violence through negotiation may be recalibrating the risk-reward equation for criminals in their favour. By offering amnesty and concessions without enforceable consequences, the government inadvertently signals that sustained violence can yield political capital. This dynamic is not new—similar patterns emerged during earlier amnesty programmes for militants in the Niger Delta, where disarmament was followed by allegations of fund mismanagement and rearmament. The current wave of violence, particularly its geographic spread and coordination, suggests criminal networks are no longer operating in isolation but adapting to state behaviour.
Globally, states that negotiate with non-state armed groups often find themselves in cycles of violence and temporary truce, especially when such groups are not ideologically driven but profit-motivated. Nigeria's situation mirrors challenges seen in parts of Latin America, where drug cartels exploit state offers of demobilisation to regroup and re-entrench. Unlike ideologically rooted insurgencies, criminal gangs focused on economic gain respond poorly to amnesty without parallel justice and rehabilitation structures.
For Nigeria and other developing nations, the implication is clear: security solutions must be rooted in institutional strength, not transactional deals. Without overhauling police and military capacity, intelligence networks, and judicial follow-through, any policy shift will remain performative. The broader African context—where weak state presence and porous borders enable armed networks—makes coordinated regional security efforts essential.
What to watch is whether the federal government commissions an independent review of past amnesty outcomes before shaping future policy.
