The National Coordinator of the National Centre for the Control of Small Arms and Light Weapons (NCCSLAW), DIG Johnson Kokumo (rtd), has warned security agencies against the diversion of officially procured weapons. He issued the warning during the inauguration of a capacity development programme on Arms Physical Security and Stockpile Management in Abuja on Monday. Kokumo stated that weaknesses in weapons management have created vulnerabilities, with assessments indicating that many illegal arms in circulation originated from official stockpiles. "A significant portion of illegal arms in circulation today passed through official channels at some point," he said. He attributed the problem to poor record-keeping, weak oversight, and inadequate storage systems.
Kokumo stressed that failure to secure and account for government-issued weapons indirectly empowers criminal networks and terrorist groups. He emphasized that proper documentation, monitoring, and security of official inventories are essential to national security. The NCCSLAW is working with national and international partners to strengthen audit and compliance systems. Also speaking, Halo Trust Operations Manager Jacob Nyaga said the training, funded by the Kingdom of the Netherlands, will be conducted in three phases. The first phase targets armoury stock keepers, focusing on handling and documentation. The second addresses leadership-level management, while the third adopts a train-the-trainer approach to sustain internal capacity.
DIG Johnson Kokumo (rtd), speaking as National Coordinator of NCCSLAW, laid bare a long-simmering fault line in Nigeria's security architecture: the state's own failure to secure the weapons meant to protect it. His admission that a "significant portion" of illegal arms once moved through official channels is not new intelligence, but a rare public confirmation of systemic collapse within armoury management across agencies. This is not merely about missing guns—it is about institutional accountability eroding under poor record-keeping and lax oversight, with the state effectively arming the threats it claims to combat.
The context here is critical: years of counterinsurgency operations, rising banditry, and multiple amnesty programmes have flooded the country with weapons, yet no credible national audit of official stockpiles has been made public. Kokumo's warning comes amid persistent reports of arms theft from military bases and police armouries, particularly in the North. That the training is being funded by the Kingdom of the Netherlands and implemented by Halo Trust—a foreign NGO—reveals a reliance on external actors to fix internal security failures. The programme's phased approach, while methodical, underscores how far behind Nigeria is in basic arms accountability.
Ordinary Nigerians, especially in conflict-prone states like Borno, Kaduna, and Niger, bear the brunt when diverted weapons end up in the hands of kidnappers and armed groups. Every unaccounted rifle or pistol from an official inventory increases the risk of violence in communities already strained by insecurity. The ripple effect is felt in rising insurance costs, collapsed livelihoods, and eroded trust in state protection.
This story fits a broader pattern: Nigeria's security sector repeatedly identifies its own weaknesses without implementing structural fixes. Reports, workshops, and foreign-backed trainings accumulate, but weapons still vanish. The cycle suggests that the problem is not lack of knowledge—but lack of political will to enforce accountability at the highest levels.
